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Abstract
According to the Henry George Theorem (HGT), the cost of a
pure local public good can be covered through a tax on related land–
rents. As we show in this paper, this general proposition does not
apply to transport facilities.
Nonetheless, even if the ‘Golden Rule’ does not apply in this con-
text, land value and transport facilities are related. We show that (i)
an improvement of the transport facilities does have a positive e¤ect
onto land value when taking into account the e¤ect on the equilibrium
city size; (ii) a simple relationship, similar to the HGT, does exist be-
tween the cost of optimal transport facilities and aggregate land rents;
(iii) any exogenous shock reducing travel costs leads to higher optimal
spending in transport facilities and higher land value. This suggests
that associated changes in land value could, in a way that we de…ne,
subsidize optimal improvements in transport facilities land rents are
related to spending in transport facilities.
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11 Introduction
According to the Henry George Theorem1 (HGT), the cost of an optimally
supplied pure local public good could (should) be …nanced through a tax on
the land value it creates. This is an attractive result, as it combines equity
considerations – landlords are the …nal bene…ciaries of the public good – with
the e¢ciency of the land tax. However, this theorem does not apply to all
kind of local public goods. In particular, we will see that it does not apply
to transport facilities2. As a consequence one should not expect a priori a
speci…c tax on related land rents to cover the entire cost of e¢cient transport
facilities.
In spite of the similarities between a classic local public good and trans-
port facilities, di¤erent mechanisms than those described by the HGT are
involved when analyzing how they a¤ect land value. Two reasons are at the
origin of this di¤erence.
First, transport facilities do not provide utility per se to their users. The
existence of well–developed transport facilities alone cannot explain agglom-
eration of economic activities and thus cannot be the exclusive source of land
rents. Transport facilities can only a¤ect land rents through a synergy with
some source of economic agglomeration.
Second, transport facilities a¤ect the travel costs, the core element of
the relationship between a local public good and land value; ceteris paribus,
better transport facilities imply lower travel costs and thus a decrease in land
value.
Nonetheless, even though the ‘Golden Rule of Local Public Finance’ does
not apply in this context, land value and transport facilities are related. We
show that: (i) an improvement of the transport facilities does have a positive
e¤ect onto land value when taking into account the e¤ect on the equilibrium
city size; (ii) a simple relationship, similar to the HGT, does exist between
1A …rst version of this theorem was proposed by Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski
(1974).
See in particular Arnott et al. (1979) for an extended description of the conditions
under which the theorem holds.
2With roughly 7% of total direct expenditures in 1994, spending in transport facili-
ties (highway and mass transit) would represent the second most important category of
spending at the local level; though far behind spending in education (36%).
Source: US Bureau of the Census, June 1997, Table No 478, ”All Governments–Detailed
Finances: 1994” and Table No 480, ”All Governments–Direct Expenditures for Public
Works: 1980 to 1994”.
2the cost of optimal transport facilities and aggregate land rents; (iii) any ex-
ogenous shock reducing travel costs leads to higheroptimal spending in trans-
port facilities and higher land value. This suggests that associated changes
in land value could, in a way that we de…ne, subsidize optimal improvements
in transport facilities.
The relationship between land–value and transport cost has been studied
previously. However most authors only consider free improvements of trans-
port. Among them, Haig (1926), Getz (1975), Vickrey (1977) and Arnott
et al. (1981). Others, like Lee et al. (1973) or Kanemoto (1980), consider
the endogenous property of travel cost but do not study how aggregate land
rents and optimal spending in transport facilities are related.
As a consequence, none of these papers provide useful information in a
public …nance perspective in the context of transport facilities. The aim of
our analysis is to provide elements that could help …ll that gap. This is done
using a simple general equilibrium model – the size of the cities is endogenous
– of an urban economy with travel costs depending on transport facilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model of
spatial organization that includes a measure of the performance of the trans-
port facilities. Section 3 provides the analysis of the relationship between
spending in transport facilities and land value. We discuss our results and
conclude in section 4. Section 5 contains the technical appendix.
2 The model
We develop a model of spatial organization of an economy, based on the
approach pioneered by von Thünen (1826) and adapted by Isard (1956) and
Alonso (1964).
2.1 Characteristics
We consider an urban economy populated by an exogenous number of iden-
tical agents. Land is homogeneous and cities form because of the existence
of some kind of Marshallian agglomeration economies. The size of the cities
is endogenous. The economic activities take place at the central business
district (CBD) of the monocentric cities. The agents live in the cities, on
land lots of unit size, and travel to the CBD, work one unit of time and buy
a composite consumption good. The …rms, located at the CBD, consume no
3geographical space. Finally, the …rms produce the same composite good in
every city, and there is no inter–city trade.
2.1.1 Government
Every city is being led by a – democratically elected – government. This
government owns the land occupied by the city, rents it competitively to the
citizens and distributes the income of this activity uniformly to the popula-
tion3.
Additionally, the government a¤ects the unitary travel cost, through it’s
choice of the lump–sum …nanced transport facilities.
Travel costs The unitary travel cost4, particularly it’s time component,
is largely dependant on the quality of the transport facilities. We consider
that the cost of a trip from distance t to the CBD5 and back is given by the





















where, Ni is the size (population) of city i, Di is the total – and di the per
capita – cost of the transport facilities. As any variable in our model, D and d
are ‡ows. They measure the cost per unit of time, including the opportunity
cost of capital, associated to transport facilities of a given quality level; the
higher Di or di; the better the facilities and the lower the unitary travel cost.
®0 is a positive scale parameter. ¡¯ is the elasticity of unitary travel cost
with respect to spending in transport facilities; we can reasonably expect
decreasing returns to scale in this context and thus 0 < ¯ < 1: ¹ is the
elasticity of unitary travel cost with respect to the size of the city. If total
spending in transport facilities are constant, the bigger the city size and the
higher the unitary travel cost; thus: ¹ > 0: If ¹ = ¯; the travel cost from
distance t is a zero degree homogeneous function and thus, the travel cost
3This is a convenient way to represent the fact that the land the city is built on, globally
belongs to it’s citizens, without having to cope with the problems of heterogeneity that
would arise if we suppose that every citizen is the owner of his own land lot. In this case,
identical individuals would have di¤erent incomes (or wealth).
4We use travel cost rather than transport cost in order to avoid the possible confusion
between the transport facilities cost and the commuting cost.
5Suppose that the unitary period corresponds to one working day, with a trip to work
(CBD) and a trip back home.
4from t to the CBD will be the same in two cities of di¤erent size but with
the same per capita spending in transport facilities. However, economies
or deseconomies of scale in the construction of transport facilities may be
related to city size (e.g. …xed costs and network e¤ects related to a metro).
Thus, given d; the absolute size of a city can a¤ect the unitary transport cost
positively (¹ > ¯) or negatively (¹ < ¯).
2.1.2 Inhabitants–consumers–workers–shareholders
The citizens of the economy produce and consume the products of the city
they are living in and are shareholders of the …rms. Their utility is given by:
Ui;t :=
½
u(ci;t) if ¨ ¸ 1
0 else (2)
where ci;t measures the consumption for an individual located at distance t
from de CBD of city i; ¨ is a measure of land consumption, and u(¢) is a
strictly increasing function. Demand for land at the individual level will be
inelastic as land consumption enters the function only in a limitative way.
Additionally, we suppose an inelastic supply of labor, normalized to 1. The
individual gross income is Ii := wi+ALRi=Ni¡Di=Ni where wi is the salary
and ALRi is the aggregate land rent of the city. This income will be used to
buy consumption goods, pay the land rent and the travel costs to the CBD.




s.t. : Ii := wi + ALRi=Ni ¡ Di=Ni ¸ rt;i + ft + ct;i
with ft the travel costs, rt;i the renting price of a land lot of unitary size and
ci;t the consumption of the composite good, which price is normalized to 1.
2.1.3 Firms
The composite good is produced competitively and there is free entry in the
market. Thus any individual …rm is a price taker, in particular with respect
to salaries.
The production function of a representative …rm in city i is y = g (Ni)L,
where L is the labor force used by the …rm. The production function at the
5…rm level is characterized by constant returns to scale; the unitary cost of
production is thus independent of the number of (identical)6 …rms that can
be represented by an arbitrary number of (one) representative …rm(s) that
behave(s) competitively.
The existence of Marshallian type economies of agglomeration, imply that
productivity of a…rmispositively related tothe size of (the laborforce of) the
city. Formally, g (Ni) > 0 and g0 (¢) > 0. These economies of agglomeration
act as a centripetal force and are su¢cient to justify the concentration of
economic activities. We consider:
g (Ni) := N
°¡1
i (4)
with ° > 1:
2.2 Equilibrium
2.2.1 Labor market
The individual labor–supply is …xed at one unit of labor per unit of time.
Thus, in a city of a given size, the wage rate is directly derivable from the
demand function for labor. Every single …rm chooses L; the labor force it
uses, and takes the labor force in the city as given. Given the market wage
wi; it’s objective function is:
¦i := g (Ni)L ¡ wiL
Under the constant returns to scale hypothesis, the pro…t function is
linear in its argument. The …rst order condition of its maximization does
thus provide no information describing the …rm’s optimal behavior. The
pro…t function is maximized for L = +1 if g (Ni) > wi; L 2 [0;+1[ if
g (Ni) = wi and L = 0 if g (Ni) < wi: In other words, the demand for labor
is a perfectly elastic function of the wage, located at g (Ni) = wi. Thus,
the aggregate and individual demand function for labor are identical. The
free entry of …rms will lead to an equilibrium wage in the labor market that
re‡ects the average productivity of the working force and secures the absence
of pro…ts. Using (4), we have:
g (Ni) := N
°¡1
i = wi (5)
6The free entry hypothesis ensures that all the surviving …rms will be identical and
e¢cient.
62.2.2 Land market
The quest of the highest utility level, through the choice the city and the
localization within the city will lead to inter– and intra–city migration of
people. These movements will in turn lead to an equilibrium situation in
which every opportunity of utility increase through a move from one location
to another must have been exploited; at the equilibrium:
ci;t = c
¤; 8t;i
Formation of cities The migration mechanism is at the source of the
formation of cities. The existence of some level of economies of agglomeration
makes a homogeneous distribution of the population over the whole territory
– the absence of cities – an unstable equilibrium. A shock leading two people
toagglomerate will initialize the global agglomeration dynamics. The average
utility level in the embryonic city being higher than elsewhere in the economy,
this attracts new residents. The city will grow. But as a consequence of the
increase of the number of residents, the average length of trips to the CBD –
thus the average quantity of resources dedicated to travel – will grow. This
fact will actuate as a centrifugal force, limiting the equilibrium size of the
city.
We will consider that the citizens (or the government) can limit the size
of the cities. As a consequence, the equilibrium city size will be optimal7. By
extension, as total population of the economy is exogenous and lives in cities,
the optimality of the size of the representative city implies the optimality of
the geographical distribution of the economy8. Migrations will stop once the
7The optimality of the equilibrium can appear surprising in the presence of externalities:
at the aggregate level, the marginal productivity of labor exceeds the wage level: g(N) +
Ng0 (N) > g(N) = w.
Nonetheless, because the land rent is returned to the citizens, this externality is implic-
itly internalized by the supply side of the labor market. The government of each city will
welcome new residents only if they increase the average utility level of the inhabitants and
so, they take into account the e¤ect on the average productivity, and thus the externality.
However, if for some reason a government could not limit the size of his city, the spatial
equilibrium organization of the economy will not necessarily be e¢cient; a system of over
populated cities is also an equilibirium.
See Kanemoto (1980), p 64–66, for an additional discussion.
8We suppose that the total population is big enough and neglect the problem associated
to the integer condition for the number of cities.
7after–tax income net of travel costs and land rent is maximized given that
the transport facilities are set at the optimal level.
If the opportunity cost of non–urban land is zero9, rT = 0. Given (3) the
objective function of the consumers, the equilibrium consumption level c¤ in











where, T is the radius of the city and Át measures the land density at a
distance t from the CBD. The constraint states that the number of citizens
cannot exceed the surface occupied by the city10. The equality will hold, as
the unoccupancy of some land is costly in terms of consumption within a
city. At equal population, the radius of a city is positively related to it’s rate
of unoccupied land, which means higher average transport cost for identical
average production and thus, lower average consumption.
Indi¤erently we will consider the central planner’s perspective, and max-
imize the distance between the average production level and the average











Measure of the land rent Even though non–urban land is abundant
within an economy, land becomes a scarce resource within the cities. Utility
maximization and positive travel costs will lead to intense competition for
land located close to the CBD of the various cities. The supply of land at one
precise localization being perfectly inelastic, the only e¤ect of competition
9We are only interested in the land–value associated to urban development and trans-
port facilities. If the non–urban land has a positive opportunity cost the results would not
be a¤ecte provided the di¤erential rather than the aggregate land–rent is being considered.
10The individual demand for land is inelastic and has been normalized to one. In a two
dimensional city for example, this unitary demand can be measured by any surface unity;
e.g. one square–foot, etc.
11The resources spent on land rents are only a transfer.
8will be to lead to relatively high prices – and associated rents – for land
located close to the CBD.
One standard result of the basic spatial model12 is that the price of land
is a decreasing function of the distance from the CBD and that it’s slope
is given by the slope of the travel cost function. The land price di¤erential







If the opportunity cost of non urban land is zero, the price of the land
located at the city center will exactly re‡ect the travel cost of the people
living at the frontier of the city. For a city of given size it is thus possible
to compute the aggregate land rent (ALR) and aggregate travel cost (ATC)
using (7) and the travel cost function (1). Taking the integral of the land







¹+¿¡¯ = ¿ (atcl) (8)












in a circular city.
Mohring (1961) and Arnott et al. (1979) give an early statement of
this result, showing that in a linear (circular) city, when travel costs are
proportional to distance (¿ = 1), the aggregate land rent is equal to (the half
part of) the aggregate travel cost14.
12Computation is given at appendix A: Also see, among others, Arnott et al. (1979).
13In a linear city, at any point located at a distance t of the CBD; there exists two
pieces of land of unitary size (same unit as t) : Át = 2; thus: N = 2T.
14For a given ¿; the per capita land rent represents a bigger proportion of the per capita
travel costs in a linear city than in a circular city.
This di¤erence is due to the fact that in the circular city, the number of people living
at any given distance from the CBD increases with this distance; thus high land rents
(people located close to the CBD) are relatively poorly weighted in comparison to high
travel costs (people located far from the CBD). In oposition, in a linear city, the number
of people living at any distance from the CBD is constant and so is the weight of high and
low land rent and high and low travel costs.
9Optimal city size Substituting the ATC given by (8) in the linear case
and by (9) in the circular case, into the objective function (6) and solving






(° ¡ 1)(¿ + 1)2¿d¯









(° ¡ 1)(¿ + 2)¼
¿
2d¯




the equilibrium–size circular city for given per capita spending in transport
facilities.
3 Analysis
3.1 Impact on land value of an improvement of trans-
port facilities
An improvement of transport facilities has a ‘price–e¤ect’ and a ‘quantity
e¤ect’ on land value. The price e¤ect is measured by considering cities of
given size. In this case, an improvement of transport facilities – an increase of
D ord –reducesthe unitary travel cost and, through the relationship between
travel costs and land value given by (8) and (9), reduces aggregate and per
capita land value in the representative city and in the whole economy15. The
magnitude of the relation is given by ¯; the elasticity of travel costs with
respect to transport facilities as can be seen in (1).
However, better transport facilities for a city of a given size imply lower
unitary travel costs. This in turn lowers the marginal cost of increasing the
city–size but does not a¤ect the marginal bene…t (the increase in per capita
production due to the existence of agglomeration economies) of doing so.
Thus, the equilibrium size of the cities grows in response to more spending
in transport facilities; this has a positive e¤ect on land value. This is the
15The average land value of the entire economy is identical to the average land value of
the representative city.
10‘quantity e¤ect’ derived from (10) and (11); formally, the elasticities of the










1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ¯ ¡ °
> 0
According to the second order condition of the parameters16, both are
positive. The higher ¯; the productivity of transport facilities and °; the
magnitude of the agglomeration economy, the bigger the e¤ect on equilibrium
city size of a change in d. On the other hand, the higher the parameters
re‡ecting the cost of an agglomeration (¿; the elasticity of the unitary travel
cost and ¹; the deseconomies of scale parameter) the weaker the e¤ect of a
change in d:
Combining the price and the quantity e¤ect yields:
"alrl;d = (° ¡ 1)"N¤
l ;d > 0 and "alrc;d = (° ¡ 1)"N¤
c ;d > 0
The quantity e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect even in a model with in-
elastic individual demand for land17; an increase in per capita spending in
transport facilities increases the per capita land value (alr) once we allow
city–size to adjust. This suggests that landowners as a whole eventually
bene…t from better transport facilities, through the e¤ect on global economic
activity, even if the …rst (short term) e¤ect of improved transport facilities
is a decrease in land value. This result is valid at the level of the entire
economy; even if cities (and thus the associated land–value) disappear in the
process. The per capita land–rent paid in the representative city increases
and so does the per capita land rent in every remaining city in the economy;
as total population is exogenous, this implies an increase of the aggregate
land–value of the economy.
16See appendix A for a computation and discussion of a workable version of the SOC of
the model.
17If demand for land were elastic and demand for travel remains inelastic, a decrease in
travel cost would imply more demand for land and thus a bigger quantity e¤ect.
11Note that though land value and transport facilities are positively related;
the e¤ect on unitary travel cost is uncertain. Using (1), the elasticity of the
unitary travel cost with respect to d, when we allow for an adjustment of the
city size is:
"®l;d = (° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿)"N¤
l ;d 7 0 and "®c;d = (° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿=2)"N¤
c ;d 7 0
For example, if (i) travel costs are less than proportionally related to dis-
tance (¿ < 1) and (ii) agglomeration economies (°) are relatively important,
one may well have ° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿ > 0 (linear cities) or ° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿=2 > 0 (circular
cities) and still have a model that is well behaved18: In these cases, after
city–size adjustment, the unitary travel cost would increase in response to
an increase in per capita spending in transport facilities.
This means that an increase in unitary travel costs within the cities may
re‡ect the economy’s best answer to bettertransport facilities rather than the
consequence of some source of ine¢ciency. Given the necessary conditions on
the parameters, this situation is more likely to occur in circular cities than
in linear ones.
3.2 Ratio between land rents and the cost of e¢cient
transport facilities
The relationship between land rents and the cost of e¢cient transport facili-
ties in a city of given size can be derived from the FOC of the maximization





The marginal bene…t of increasing D is ¡ATCD; the aggregate reduction
of the travel costs for the city. The marginal cost of increasing D is one. As
can be seen from (8) and (9), if the travel cost is related to distance through






18The model still requires that 1+¹+¿¡¯¡° > 0 (linear case) or 1+¹+¿=2¡¯¡° > 0
(circular case). Thus, if ° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿ > 0 (linear case) or ° ¡ 1 ¡ ¿=2 > 0 (circular case),
the diseconomies of scale in transport utilities related to the city size would have to be
relatively high (¹ > ¯) for the model to behave well.
12This implies that the marginal bene…t exceeds the marginal cost as long
as D < ¯ATC:
Using (8) and (9) we can also write:
ALR = g (¿)ATC
















where g (¿) is ¿ and ¿=2 for a linear and circular cities respectively.
This simple relationship is similar to the ‘Golden Rule’ between aggregate
land rents and the cost of – or spending on – an optimal pure local public
good. However, this result is closer to a ‘Silver Rule’ in the sense that land
rents will match the cost of optimal transport facilities only under particular
parametersvalue. Only two parametersappear in the rule: ¯; the elasticity of
travel cost with respect to spending in transport facilities and ¿; the elasticity
of travel cost with respect to distance. In a linear city, considering ¯ < 1
(decreasing returns for spending in transport facilities) and linear travel costs
(¿ = 1), the aggregate land rent will always exceed the cost of e¢cient
transport facilities. Still for linear travel costs, but in a circular city, if
1=2 < ¯ < 1; the cost will exceed the aggregate land rent. Remember that
all the variables are ‡ows; thus, if 0 < ¯ < 1=2; the per period land value in
a circular city, could integrally …nance the per period spending in transport
facilities (capital and maintenance costs).
3.3 E¤ects on land value of optimal improvements of
transport facilities
Using the whole land rent to …nance or subsidize the transport facilities is
questionable, in particular in a model with pure multiplicative e¤ects. One
cannot distinguish the part of the aggregate land rent that is attributable to
13the (exogenous) existence of agglomeration economies, from the part directly
attributable to transport facilities. Only the synergy between both elements
is being measured. This is problematic if the agglomeration economies are
not due to a purely exogenous phenomenon. If they are due to the existence
of a local public good, or to economies of scale at the level of the …rm19, the
determination of which part of the aggregate land rent should be used to
…nance the former or to subsidize the latter, and which part should be used
to …nance the transport facilities is debatable.
One way to deal with this problem could be the following: suppose one
starts from an optimal situation where a given proportion of transport facili-
ties is …nanced by land rents. Suppose now that parameter ®0, the exogenous
component of the unitary travel cost, decreases in response to a technologi-
cal progress in the transport sector or decrease in the price of energy. This
decrease in ®0 will positively a¤ect the equilibrium city size, the optimal per
capita spending in facilities and the equilibrium per capita land rent. The
e¤ect on land rents can be split into the following e¤ects: (i) a direct e¤ect
from a change in ®0, leaving both the city size and per capita facilities un-
changed, (ii) the e¤ect of a change in the equilibrium city size leaving the
per capita facilities unchanged, (iii) the e¤ect of a change in the optimal per
capita spending in facilities.
Changes in land value associated to points (i) and (ii) are not induced by
any change in facilities. Land rents grow but per capita spending in transport
facilities remains constant. As such, there would be no direct justi…cation
to use this increase in per capita land rents to subsidize facilities: On the
other side, changes in land value associated to point (iii) are directly related
to changes in transport facilities and could, in the philosophy of the ‘Golden
Rule’, be taxed away speci…cally to subsidize the related cost.
Formally, a measure of point (i) and (ii) is given by the elasticity of (8)
and (9) with respect to ®0, where N is set at it’s optimal level given by (10)
























1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ¯ ¡ °
< 0 (14)
Based on the SOC of the maximization, both expressions are negative.
Leaving the per capita spending unchanged, a decrease in ®0 induces, through
the e¤ect on the equilibrium size of the cities, an increase of the average land
rent in the economy.
Point (iii) requires the knowledge of how the optimal d is being a¤ected
by a change in ®0: The optimal d, computed at the spatial equilibrium of
the economy, maximizes (6) the per capita consumption in the representa-
tive city, when the latter is set at it’s equilibrium level given by (10) and
(11) respectively. We observe that the cost of optimal transport facilities

















¯ (° ¡ 1)
¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ¯
(15)
Optimal spending in transport facilities is proportionally related to pro-
duction. Thus, as the production grows more than proportionally to the size
of the cities (through the agglomeration economies), we know that the cost
of optimal transport facilities grows with the equilibrium size of the cities.
An economy with greater equilibrium – and optimal – city–size should spend
the same proportion of its production in transport facilities as an economy
with smaller equilibrium city size; however per capita spending in transport
facilities will be greater, the greater the city size.
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1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ° ¡ ¯°
< 0 (17)
20See appendix B for computation.
15Both expressions are negative and of greater magnitude than (13) and
(14) respectively: Note that, for given parameter values, the impact on land
value is bigger if the city shape is circular rather than linear.
Using (13) and (14) as well as the elasticity of the optimal level of trans-
port facilities with respect to a change in ®0 given by:
"d¤
l ;®0 = ¡
° ¡ 1
1 + ¹ + ¿ ¡ ° ¡¯°
< 0 and "d¤
c;®0 = ¡
° + °¯ ¡ 1 ¡¯
1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ° ¡ ¯°
< 0
we can compute the part of a desired improvement of transport facilities that



















¯ (° ¡ 1)































for a circular city, where 0 < ³l < 121 and 0 < ³c < 122.
According to (12), the ratio between optimal transport facilities and land
value is ¯=g (¿) and does not depend on ®0; as a consequence, any change in
the optimal level of transport facilities will be accompanied by a proportional
change in land value. The inverse of this ratios give us the dollar change in
21The SOC (appendix A) on the parameters are such that 1 + ¹ + ¿ ¡ ° ¡ ¯° > 0 and
° > 1. This implies that 1+¹+¿ ¡¯ ¡° > 0 and that 1+¹+¿ ¡¯ ¡° > ¯(° ¡1) and
thus that 0 < ³ < 1:
22The SOC (appendix A) on the parameters in the circular case are such that 1 + ¹ +
¿=2 ¡ ° ¡ ¯° > 0, ¯ > 0 and ° > 1. This implies that 1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ¯ ¡° > 0 and that
1 +¹ +¿=2 ¡¯ ¡ ° > ¯(° ¡1) and thus that 0 < ³ < 1:
16land value induced by any optimal dollar change in facilities. Thus, when ¯ is
smaller(greater) than g (¿); one additional dollarspent in transport facilities,
that results from an exogenous decrease in the parameter ®0, will generate a
land value increase of more (less) than one dollar: However, according to (18)
and (19), only a part ³l and ³c of this change in land value can justi…ably be
allocated to subsidize transport facilities: As a consequence the ratio between
the increase in land valuethat can be attributed toimprovementsin transport
facilitiesis strictly23 less than ¿=¯ in linear cities and ¿=(2¯) in circular cities.
In summary, any desired improvement in transport facilities that result
from an exogenous decrease of the scale parameter of the travel cost function
(a decrease in the price of energy for example), has a positive e¤ect on the
value of per capita land rents of the economy. This e¤ect on land value can
be greater or smaller than the own change in optimal spending in transport
facilities: However one can argue that only a fraction of this change in land
value should be used to subsidize the related cost. This fraction will depend
on the parameter values of the model. Most parameters have an ambiguous
e¤ect, but the ratio is greater the greater the scale economies (°) and the
smaller the deseconomies of scale in transport facilities associated to city size
(¹):
4 Discussion and conclusion
In an ideal world, the pricing of public facilities should be independent of
the capacity cost. The pricing scheme should only be set in order to lead to
an e¢cient use of the facilities. In the case of a local public facilities, a tax
on the related land rents would, according to the Henry George Theorem,
exactly cover the capacity cost. Using such a tax on land rents presents the
advantage of creating few (no) distortions and of meeting some social justice
goals in the sense that the landowners pay the bene…ts they derive from the
existence of the public facilities.
In this paper we saw that in the particular context of transport facilities,
the Henry George Theorem does not apply. However land rents are strongly
related to spending in transport facilities, though in a di¤erent way than
23Reaching these upper limits, ¿=¯ in the linear case and ¿=(2¯) in the circular case,
would require land value changes to only depend on changes of d or formally, that (13) or
(14) equal 0: However this would require ° = 1 and in this case the equilibrium city size
would be zero.
17they are related to a classic local public good. The ratio between optimal
per capita spending in transport facilities and per capita land rents, only
depends on two parameters: the elasticity of the travel cost with respect to
distance and the elasticity of travel cost with respect to spending in transport
facilities.
Additionally, we saw that land value is positively related to improvements
in transport facilities, and discussed to what extend this relationship can lead
to the former in order to subsidize the latter.
These results give some theoretical support to the use of taxes on property
value to …nance spending in transport facilities. However, they also showthat
a priori, neitherthe cost of optimal transport facilities will be exactly covered
by the aggregated land rent of a city, nor the cost of an optimal improvement
of transport facilities, will be exactly covered by a tax on the change in land
value directly related to it.
This paper gives a …rst theoretical support to the use of taxes on land
value to …nance spending in transport facilities. It would be interesting
to see how the results are being altered if a more realistic pattern for the
individual demands for land and travelling is being considered; however, this
would require the use of numerical methods to solve the model as analytical
solutions are unlikely in this context. One could also consider explicit land
consumption for transport facilities and transport congestion’s problems with
or without user’s charge, following Kanemoto (1980) or Fujita (1986).
5 Appendix
5.0.1 Appendix A
Rent gradient we derive the price structure of land within a city using the
properties of the indirect utility functions. The indirect utility of a person
living at t units of distance from the center is:
Vt := v(Yt;p;rt)
where Yt is the gross income net of the travel costs, p is the price of the
consumption good and rt the unitary land rent.
At the equilibrium, the utility levels at any location are identical. Any
utility di¤erential induce an emigration of people from locations providing a
relatively low level of utility; this will lead to a decrease of the land value of































A marginal decrease of the price of land will induce an increase of the indi-
vidual’s utility corresponding to the product between the disposable income
generated by this decrease and the marginal utility of income.
Both, the price of the consumption good produced in the CBD and the











The price of land is a decreasing function of the distance from the CBD.
It’s slope is given by the travel cost function. In other words, the land price
di¤erential exactly re‡ectsthe travel cost di¤erential. And as the opportunity
cost of non urban land is zero, the price of the land located at the city center
will exactly re‡ect the travel cost of the people living at the frontier of the
city.
5.0.2 Appendix B
Second order condition in the linear city case The exact SOC on our
parameters, based on the conditions on the Hessian matrix are cumbersome
and unworkable. We thus base our analysis on an intuitive condition required






where ± := dN1¡° is the proportion of aggregate production that is spent into
transport facilities. In other words, we consider that the parameters have
to be such that higher agglomeration economies (higher °) lead to bigger
19cities at the equilibrium, in particular if the proportion of the aggregate
production dedicated to transport facilities (±) remains constant. This leads
to the following condition on the parameters in the linear case:
1 + ¹ + ¿ ¡ ° ¡¯° > 0
Proof: The city size that maximizes the per capita consumption given
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the sign of @N¤
l (±)=@° depends in particular on the sign of:
@Al
@°
= (1 ¡ ±)(¿ + 1)2
¿±
¯ ¹ + ¿ ¡ ¯
®0(¿ + ¹ ¡ ¯°)
2
Considering that by de…nition 0 < ± < 1 and ®0;¯;°¹;¿ > 0; the sign of
@Al=@° depends on the sign of ¹+¿ ¡¯: For N¤
l (±) to be an interior solution,
Al is to be positive. Given ° > 1 (presence of agglomeration economies), we
need (¹ + ¿ ¡ ¯°) > 0, and thus, @A=@° > 0.
As a consequence, @N¤
l (±)=@° > 0 only if:
1 + ¹ + ¿ ¡ ° ¡¯° > 0
which represents the intuitive second order condition in the linear case.
Second order condition in the circular city case We are looking for





This leads to the following condition on the parameters in the circular case:
1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ° ¡ ¯° > 0
20Proof: The city size that maximizes the per capita consumption given
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¯ (1 ¡ ±)(¿ + 2)
2¹ + ¿ ¡ 2¯
®0(2¹ + ¿ ¡ 2¯°)
2
Considering that by de…nition 0 < ± < 1 and ®0;¯;°¹;¿ > 0; the sign of
@Ac=@° depends on the sign of 2¹+¿ ¡2¯: For N± to be an interior solution,
Ac is to be positive. Given ° > 1 (presence of agglomeration economies), we
need (2¹ + ¿ ¡ 2¯°) > 0, and thus, @Ac=@° > 0.
As a consequence, @N¤
c (±)=@° > 0 only if:
1 + ¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ° ¡ ¯° > 0
which represents our intuitive second order condition in the circular case.
5.0.3 Appendix C
Optimal spending in transport facilities in the linear city The op-
timal spending in transport facilities solves the FOC of the maximization of
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21Optimal spending in transport facilities in the circular city The
optimal spending in transport facilities solves the FOC of the maximization






















¯ (° ¡ 1)
¹ + ¿=2 ¡ ¯
22I would like to thank Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Claude Henry and
Ralph Turvey, for very helpful comments and discussions.
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